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Abstract
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This paper investigates who is most affected by informal 
competition and how regulation and enforcement 
affect the extent and nature of this competition. Using 
newly-collected enterprise data for 6,466 manufacturing 
formal firms across 14 countries in Latin America, the 
authors show that formal firms affected by head-to-head 
competition with informal firms largely resemble them. 
They are small credit constrained, underutilize their 
productive capacity, serve smaller customers, and are in 
markets with low entry costs.  In countries where the 
This paper—a product of the Enterprise Analysis Unit, Financial and Private Sector Development Department—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to study and promote reforms in the business environment. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at flamanna@worldbank.org. 
government is effective and business regulations onerous, 
formal firms in industries characterized by low costs to 
entry feel the sting of informal competition more than 
in other business environments. Finally, the analysis 
finds that in an economy with relatively onerous tax 
regulations and a government that poorly enforces its 
tax code, the percentage of firms adversely affected by 
informal competition will be reduced from 38.8 to 37.7 
percent when the government increases enforcement to 




Who fears competition from informal firms? 



























Keywords: Informality, Competition, Regulations, Latin America, Manufacturing 
JEL:  D21, D40, L51, L60, N66, O17,  
 
                                                      
1
 Contact authors: World Bank Group, Washington DC, USA. Emails: agonzalez4@worldbank.org, and 
flamanna@worldbank.org. Introduction 
In a 2006 World Bank survey of firms of 14 Latin American countries,
2
 38.7 percent of 
manufacturing firms ranked competition from informal firms as a one of their top three obstacles 
to doing business, ahead of issues such as tax rates and access to finance. Yet there are wide 
differences between countries as to how seriously informal competition affects formal firms. In 
Uruguay, 55.6 percent of firms rate competition from informal firms as one the top three 
obstacles; while only 18.9 percent of firms in Panama consider informal competition a serious 
obstacle.   
While competition is an engine of economic growth in most markets since it induces 
higher rates of productivity growth, competition between formal and informal firms is not 
necessarily productive. Informal competition is damaging to overall economic performance since 
the cost advantage informal firms enjoy is a result of ignoring many or all business regulations.  
There are also cost disadvantages to informality.  Some of these disadvantages stem 
from inaccessibility to formal credit markets and to the courts (Djankov et al, 2003). This makes 
informal firms less efficient. For example, to compensate for the lack of legal protection that 
courts provide, informal firms make deals that are small to minimize possible losses and they 
make these deals with parties where there are long-established relations. Small contracts, 
however, usually entail high fixed costs. Also, limiting transactions to parties with whom informal 
firms have long-established relations means that informal firms exploit only a small and narrow 
set of market opportunities.  Inefficiencies and limited markets is the price of reducing 
uncertainty and insuring against losses in the informal sector.  
Given these cost disadvantages, why do some firms decide to stay informal?  For some 
firms informality affords them cost advantages that allow them to compete profitably.  The focus 
of this paper is to determine the nature of the competitive effects informal firms’ cost advantages 
have against formal firms. We do this by looking at formal firms most affected by informal 
competition.  We find that some formal firms are more adversely affected by competition from 
informal firms than others and we examine why these are more affected based on their 
characteristics and the environments in which they operate.  
The business environment matters in determining the nature and size of the cost 
advantages of informality. The higher the regulatory burdens of being formal, the higher are the 
savings from informality. This cost-benefit calculation affects the size of the informal sector as 
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  2 higher savings from being informal draws more firms to informality, resulting in a bigger informal 
sector (Djankov et al 2002, Schneider 2000).  While the size of the informal sector is an 
important factor in determining the competitive effects on formal firms—more firms in a market 
generally means more price competition—regulation is most importantly a major determinant of 
the intensity of competition from the informal sector. 
 The government’s capacity to enforce regulations also matters in the assessment of the 
cost of regulatory obligations firms face. An informal firm’s chances of getting caught for not 
complying with laws and regulations are a direct function of the government’s capacity to 
enforce these.  
The two points above on the determinants of the size and intensity of informal 
competition are the central focus of this paper. We investigate for which firms and in what 
environment competition from the informal sector affects formal manufacturing firms most. We 
find that firms most concerned about competition from the informal sector are those that 
resemble informal firms the most. Moreover, we find that in economies where the government’s 
ability to enforce rules is high and business entry costs, and labor and tax regulations are 
relatively onerous, firms in industries with low costs to entry are more likely to cite informal 
competition as a constraint difficult to overcome.  
We reach the findings by analyzing data from the 2006 Latin American regional roll-out 
of the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys.
3
 The data covers over 6,400 formal manufacturing 
firms from 14 countries in South and Central America. The data provide information on the 
business environment in each economy, details of firm-level operations, and specifics on the 
quality of services and infrastructure that these firms use. We also use the Doing Business 
indicators
4
 to obtain measures of the regulatory burdens in each country. We use the World 
Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators
5
 (Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007) 
index to assess each government’s ability to effectively enforce laws and regulations on their 
books.  Together, the Doing Business and the Worldwide Governance Indicators give us a 
measure of effective regulation.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the hypothesis as to which 
formal, manufacturing firms will be most affected by informal competition. We describe our data, 
the econometric model and the variables used to test our hypothesis. Section 2 examines the 
features of the business environment that may explain in which countries informal competition is 
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  3 most effective (hurts the most) against formal firms. In Section 3, we investigate which business 
environments are more conducive to effective informal competition. Section 4 concludes.   
1  The data  
The data we use come from three World Bank datasets; Enterprise Surveys, Doing 
Business and the Worldwide Governance Indicators.  
The Enterprise Surveys collect data from key manufacturing and service sectors in every 
region of the world.  For our analytical purposes, we focus on manufacturing firms and we use 
the 2006 World Bank Enterprise Surveys for Latin America. In this newly collected roll-out, 
6,466 formal manufacturing firms were surveyed in fourteen Central and South American 
countries; Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. The Enterprise Survey roll-out in 
Latin America was done at the same time and with the same questionnaire and the same 
survey implementation and sampling strategy. Given the standardized methodology (discussed 
below) the data are optimized for the type of cross-country comparisons employed throughout 
this paper.  
The surveys employ standardized survey instruments and a uniform sampling 
methodology to minimize measurement error and to yield data that are comparable across 
economies. The sampling methodology of the Enterprise Surveys generates sample sizes 
appropriate to achieve two main objectives: first, to benchmark the investment climate of 
individual economies across the world and, second, to conduct firm performance analyses 
focusing on determining how business environment constraints affect productivity and job 
creation in selected sectors. The universe of industries is stratified by region, size and industry. 
The number of manufacturing industries to be defined as an individual stratum in each country 
is chosen based on the Gross National Income (GNI) level of each country. 
The standardized Enterprise Survey questionnaire includes both objective and 
subjective questions referring to the business environment. Subjective variables are based on 
the perceptions of the surveyed firms regarding key factors that constrain their operations.  The 
objective questions refer to specific quantifiable measures of firms’ activities (sales, number of 
workers, type of credit received, etc.) and objective description of constraints they face (number 
of power outages, number of days to get an electricity connection, losses due to theft, etc).  
To measure the fixed and variable regulatory costs that a firm incurs to start and operate 
a business in Latin America we use several of the 2006 Doing Business indicators. The Doing 
Business database provides comparable, objective measures of business regulations for 175 
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capita income), cost of obtaining a license (percent of income per capita), the minimum capital 
requirement to start a business (percent of per capita income), cost of registering property 
(percent of property value), the level of tax on profit and on labor and the employment cost. A 
more detailed description of the each variable and how each country performs in the region 
follow.  
The World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators measure, for over 200 
countries and territories worldwide, six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption. These  indicators  are based on several hundred individual 
variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources 
constructed by 31 different organizations. We are interested in measures of the government’s 
capacity to enforce its laws fairly, consistently, and effectively. In our model we include one 
governance indicator; government effectiveness.  
1.1  The dependent variable 
The Enterprise Surveys contain sets of questions that obtain opinions on the difficulty of 
overcoming regulatory obligations and other important obstacles that managers must navigate 
around in running their businesses. The data we use measure the relative impediment of 
informal competition on manufacturing firms in the formal sector based on the opinions of 
managers asked to name rank the severity of obstacles to their operations. More specifically, 
firms in all countries are asked to rank the top-three obstacles that affect operation and growth 
of their establishment. A list of sixteen (16) potential obstacles is provided; access to finance, 
access to land, business licensing and permits, corruption, crime, theft and disorder, customs 
and trade regulations, electricity, functioning of the courts, inadequately educated workforce, 
labor regulations, political instability, macroeconomic instability, practices of competitors in the 
informal sector, tax administration, tax rates and transportation.  
For each country, we record whether a manager of a firm ranked “Practices of 
competitors in the informal sector” as either the first, second or third biggest obstacle. We 
construct a variable that takes on the value of one (1) if the manager ranked the obstacle in the 
top three and zero (0) otherwise. The hypothesis is that formal firms that rank the informal 
competition as a top three obstacle are most likely to resemble informal firms since they 
compete in the similar sectors, in the same market, using similar technologies.  
  5 1.2  The explanatory variables 
We begin with variables of interest that have often been cited in the literature as 
characteristics of establishments most likely to face informal competition. The variables of 
interest are:  
1.  Size – We hypothesize that small firms are more affected by informal competition. For 
each firm in the sample, we use the log of the firm employment as the size variable.   
2.  Use of formal finance – Limited access to financial services is one of the main 
constraints for informal firms (Morrisson 1995). We use a measure of the use of 
commercial lines of credit used as a way to assess the level of access to finance that 
firms have.  In our sample, over 57.4 percent of manufacturing firms have an overdraft 
facility, 49.6 percent have an outstanding loan or line of credit from a financial institution, 
and 39.4 percent of firms said that they did not need a loan. Moreover, only 37.3 percent 
of our sample has both a line of credit or outstanding loan and an overdraft facility. When 
we take these firms and the 39.4 percent of those firms that said that they did not need a 
loan, we have 69.1 percent of firms that are neither credit constrained and/or are above 
average users of financial services. The remaining 30.9 percent are the firms most likely 
to be in head-to-head competition with informal firms. We create a binary variable where 
a value of one (1) indicates a firm that is credit constrained.   
3.  Capacity utilization – A recent World Bank study on informality in Latin America  points 
out  that “formality rises rapidly with firm size and productivity” (pg.  135; Perry et al, 
2007). We use capacity utilization as a measure of productivity to see if the continuum 
between formality and productivity found in that study also holds with respect to the 
competitive pressure from informal firms that formal firms have to overcome. As before, 
we argue that firms that are less productive, therefore tending to be more like informal 
firms, face informal competition more directly than more productive formal firms.  
4.  Buyer – We hypothesize that firms that have large buyers as their customers are 
markedly different from informal firms and will therefore not be in direct competition with 
them. Having large buyers as customers requires that the firm supply at large volumes 
and at the lowest price since large customers have the bargaining power to push prices 
low. In order to satisfy both of these requirements, this implies economies of scale by the 
supplying firm. Furthermore, in order to satisfy their standards of quality and 
consistency, large buyers usually require stable, long-term business to business 
relationships most often associated with older, established suppliers. These 
requirements may not be easily satisfied by informal firms, making the informal sector 
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takes on a value of one (1) when the firm’s main buyer of its outputs are medium-size 
private firms (20-100 workers), small private firms (fewer than 20 workers, or individuals, 
and a value of zero (0) otherwise.  
5.  Exporter – For reasons of competitiveness, scale, technology, access to markets, 
access to credit, uncertain legal status, fixed costs of exporting, etc., informal firms are 
neither able nor willing to compete in export markets. For this reason, we include a 
dummy variable, where the value of one (1) represents an exporter and zero (0) does 
not.  
6.  Industry – The industry dummies are used as control variables. The signs of their 
regression coefficients are also of interest to us. We expect that industries with higher 
fixed cost of entry, such as chemicals, machinery, electronics and metals, face less 
informal competition than firms where the cost of entry is relatively lower. High costs of 
entry deter informal firms in three ways. First, informal firms have little capital, and poor 
access to financial markets, with which to finance entry.  Second, informal firms have a 
relatively shorter time horizon with which to reap returns of their investments. Since 
informal firms face a greater uncertainty to their survival, investments must have more 
immediate returns. Lastly, higher fixed cost industries are usually characterized by 
economies of scale. Informal firms rarely achieve the size required to reap these 
economies and are therefore at a cost disadvantage against much larger, formal firms. 
In the appendix, there is a list of industries (at the 2-digit ISIC level) included in each 
industry category.  We expect the industry dummies for high, fixed cost industries 
(chemicals, machinery, electronics and metals) to be negative, in comparison to the 
comparator industry (food processing), and positive for all other industries.  
7.  Financial dependence – In our second econometric specification of our model, we 
substitute the industry dummies for the industry-level Rajan-Zingales (1998) 
classification of industry sector. This index is based on how much external financing 
firms in each industry need to operate and grow. We use this index as a proxy for capital 
intensity and entry costs. Higher values of this index mean that the industry is 
comparatively more dependent on external financing. Higher dependence on external 
financing translates into higher costs of entry which indicates a lower likelihood of being 
exposed to direct competition from informal firms.   
 
  7 Next, we list variables that represent the regulatory cost that a firm incurs in starting a 
business and operating it. We chose to include only regulations that force firms to incur 
monetary costs of taxes and start-up regulations.
6
 Also, we limit our focus to start up costs and 
taxes since these are the regulatory costs most cited by the informality literature as the greatest 
deterrent, and the greatest cost savings, to firms staying informal (Perry et al 2007).  
 
8.  Tax rate – This Doing Business indicator refers to the tax that a company must pay or 
withhold in a given year. It also measures the administrative burden in paying taxes. 
Taxes are measured at all levels of government. In our sample, firms in Argentina pay 
the highest total tax rates (117 percent of profit) and Uruguay the lowest (28 percent).  
9.  Tax on profit – This Doing Business indicator is a subset of the tax rate variable 
described above. This variable measures the amount of taxes on profits paid by the 
business as a percentage of commercial profits.  It is reported as a rate of commercial 
profits. Guatemala and Mexico have the lowest tax rates on profits; 2.7 and 5.3 percent 
of commercial profits. Bolivia and Nicaragua have the highest tax rates on profits; 62.7 
and 27 percent, respectively.  
10. Tax on labor – This variable is also a subset of the tax rate variable and it specifically 
measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions on labor paid by the 
business as a percentage of commercial profits. This amount include mandatory social 
security contributions paid by the employer both to public and private entities, as well as 
other taxes or contributions related to employing workers. Colombia has the highest tax 
rates on labor (31.76 percent of commercial profits).  Argentina and Mexico are close 
seconds with 30.2 percent in each country. The lowest tax rates on labor in the region 
are in Chile, Uruguay, Honduras and El Salvador at 3.9, 7.2 11.0 and 11.6 percent, 
respectively.  
11. Tax other – This Doing Business indicator measures the amount of taxes and 
mandatory contributions paid by the business that are not already included in the 
previous two categories; taxes on profits and taxes on labor.  In this category, Argentina 
records a rate of 75.9 percent, Colombia a rate of 25.9 percent and Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua tax rates on other items of 23.4, 22.7, and 19.7 percent, 
respectively. These five economies have the highest rate of taxation for this category in 
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  8 our sample.  In nearly all other countries, there is negligible tax rates applied to this 
category of taxes.  
12. Cost to start a business – The total cost to start up an industrial or commercial 
business. These include obtaining all necessary licenses and permits and completing 
any required notifications, verifications or inscriptions for the company and employees 
with relevant authorities.  The largest cost in the region to open a business is found in 
Bolivia where on average new incomers in the market pays 141 percent of per capita 
GNI, while the cheapest in Chile (9.8 percent of per capita income). 
13. Minimum capital requirement to start a business – This Doing Business indicator 
records the paid-in minimum capital requirement that the entrepreneur needs to deposit 
in a bank before registration starts. The amount is typically specified in the commercial 
code or the company law. In order to make that data comparable across countries, the 
minimum capital requirement is computed as percent of per capita income, for example 
in Ecuador and Mexico the paid-in minimum capital recorded is 7.7 percent and 
respectively 12.5 percent of per capita income.
7
 
14. Government effectiveness – According to World Bank Institute’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (Kauffman et al, 2007), this variable measures the quality of 
public and civil services and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. For each indicator on government effectiveness, higher 
scores correspond to better outcomes. In this group of 14 countries, Chile and Uruguay 
perform best in the region for the two governance indicators while Ecuador and 
Paraguay are the worst performers.   
 
In the Appendix to this paper, Table 1 lists the data source for each explanatory variable 
we use in our regressions and describe how the explanatory variables are constructed. Table 2 
shows the main descriptive statistics for all variables of interest (number of observation, mean 
and standard deviation, maximum and minimum).  
1.3  Who fears informal competition? 
We test our hypothesis that formal firms most resembling informal firms are more likely 
to be affected by informal competition with the following probit regression: 
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                                             ijk ijk j ijk X F C Y ε γ λ + + + =                                                       (1) 
 
The dependent variable (Y) is a binary variable constructed to indicate a one (1) if firm (i) in 
industry (j) in country (k) considers competitors from the informal sector to be one of the top-
three obstacles for their businesses and zero (0) otherwise.  The dependent variable is a 
function of a constant (C ), a variable (F ) that is either an industry dummy for specification or a 
sector-level measure of the financial dependence of industries used in the other specification of 
this model. A vector of characteristics of the firm ( ) that includes the size of the firm, in 
logarithm, the extent to which a firm is credit constraint, a dummy to measure whether large or 
small buyers are its customers, rates of capacity utilization, and the log of the age of the firm. 
Finally, the variable (
X
ε ) represents the error term.  In an alternative estimation, we replace the 
variable for the financial dependence of industries (F ) with industry dummies as proxies for 
how easy or difficult it is to enter into certain industries. We discuss this alternative explanation 
in a section on sector effects.  
In estimating Equation (1), we include control variables, such as industry and country 
level fixed effects. We also cluster at the industry and region levels. The term ε  is an error term 
which is potentially heteroskedastic that may be correlated across all firms within each region 
within the country and within each industry. We note that in some countries, large ones 
especially, measures of informal competition is a regional, more likely local, phenomenon. This 
makes sense. Informal firms are likely to compete for and in local markets. It would be unusual 
to see informal firms that could supply markets nationally and much less internationally.  For this 
reason, we think that it is reasonable, and less restrictive, to assume that the effects of informal 
competition are regional and not national. Therefore, we calculate robust standard errors that 
allow for clustering by region. Lastly, because the cost and demand structures vary by industry, 
we use clustering at the two-digit ISIC industry level because we expect that there exists 
independence of observations between industries but not within.    
1.4 Empirical  results 
We provide the empirical results of our model and the correlation matrix among 
independent variables in tables 3 and 4 of the Appendix. We find support for the proposed 
hypothesis that those firms most likely to identify informal competition as a primary obstacle to 
their businesses are also firms that are most similar in characteristics to firms in the informal 
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from informal competition. 
The results of our probit regression are largely as expected (Table 3); formal 
manufacturing firms that are smaller, serve smaller customers, are less efficient and depend 
less on formal credit markets than others.   
Some unexpected results are evident as well. While we would expect younger firms to 
be most under competitive threat from informal firms, since informal firms are also relatively 
young, this is not the case in our data. In fact, there is a strong, robust statistically significant 
positive correlation between the age of the firm and the severity of the perceived competitive 
threat from informal firms.  
Many explanatory variables—age, exporter, size of customers served—are highly 
correlated with the size of a firm (see Table 4), but as we can see in our regressions, once we 
introduce those highly correlated variables, one at a time, the coefficient on size in each 
equation does not vary nor does its statistical significance, indicating that the results are robust.  
1.5  What to make of the industry effects? 
While we did not report the coefficients for the industry dummies in Table 3, we do so in 
Table 3.a of the Appendix.  In examining these empirical results, they show that firms in 
industries commonly characterized by relatively high fixed costs are also firms that did not see 
informal competition as one of the top three obstacles to the operation and growth of their 
business. Given this empirical result, we examine whether this is a robust and statistically 
important pattern.   
Our empirical results show that heavy industries, those with high fixed costs such as 
chemicals, electronics, machinery and equipment, paper and paper products and manufacturers 
of non-metallic minerals products, are generally less concerned about informal competition than 
are industries in sectors with lower fixed costs such as textiles, food products, or garments. 
Since high fixed costs translate into high cost of entry, no matter what the business 
environment, there exists low likelihood that informal competition would be a threat to these 
heavy industries in comparison to low fixed cost sectors.  
A more direct way to test this hypothesis, that industries with high fixed costs are less 
susceptible to the direct competition from the informal sector, is to find a measure for fixed cost, 
or entry costs, and test the hypothesis directly. We substitute the industry dummies with direct 
measures of fixed costs. We use the Rajan-Zingales (1998) classification of industry sector 
based on how much external financing firms need to operate and grow. We use this index as a 
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particular measure, the median firm’s dependence on external finance, to categorize each 
industry’s universal and constant technological characteristic that distinguishes it from other 
industries. The index is constructed so that higher values mean that the industry is 
comparatively more dependent on external financing. Given the pattern observed from the 
probit regression with industry dummies, our hypothesis is that higher dependence on external 
financing translates into higher costs of entry which translates into a lower likelihood of being 
exposed to direct competition from informal firms.  
The empirical results support our hypothesis. The two model specifications, one with 
dummy variables for industry at the two-digit ISIC level (Table 3.a) and the other with the Rajan-
Zingales financial dependency variable (Table 5) point in the same direction; the negative 
coefficient for the financial dependence variables indicates that firms in more capital intensive 
industries, holding everything else constant, will be less affected by competitive threats from 
informal firms.  
2  Is informal competition a serious obstacle in Latin America? 
In this section we study how the business environment affects the level of competitive 
intensity between the informal and formal sectors. The competitive intensity is a function of the 
costs that informal firms avoid as a result of not complying with some or all legal obligations. If 
the cost of regulatory compliance is high, then formal firms will have a cost disadvantage 
against informal firms and will suffer in head-to-head competition.  So the existence of high 
levels of regulation. For these reasons, it is important to examine the relationship between how 
difficult it is for firms to overcome informal competition and the nature of the regulatory 
environment.  
As discussed in the introduction, about 40 percent of all manufacturing firms in Latin 
American consider informal competition as one of the top-three most serious obstacles. That 
informality is the number one obstacle in Latin America is not surprising. Latin America has long 
been cited as a region with a very large and very active, and growing, informal sector. Estimates 
by Schneider (2005) over the size of the informal economy in 145 countries across the globe 
indicate that Latin America has the second highest rate of informality, trailing only Africa. The 
question then is why informality is so high in a region where most countries are middle income 
and informality is an issue most associated with low-income countries. 
Part of the explanation for Latin America’s large informal sector may be the region’s 
business environment; poor regulatory and institutional quality that prevails in many countries in 
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norms and regulations, excessive red tape and bureaucracy, unclear rules of the game, and a 
weak rule of the law, are among several governance-related factors that significantly increase 
the cost of doing business. The strong impact of an inefficient and burdensome regulatory 
environment is well documented (Guasch and Hahn, 1999, WDR 2005).  The point of 
institutional quality and its effects on informality are also made by Loayza, Oviedo and Servén 
(2004). 
That Latin America has burdensome regulation is illustrated a World Bank report on the 
investment climate (World Bank 2007). In that report, a majority of Latin American countries 
(about two-thirds) are below the institutional quality that income levels and levels of economic 
development predict for countries in the region. Latin America also performs poorly with regard 
to the Ease of Doing Business indicators produced by the Doing Business data we discussed 
earlier. Latin America is the region with the largest number of both procedures (12) and days 
(66) required to start a new business. This compares with 9 procedures and 56 days in East 
Asia, or 7 procedures and 24 days in high income countries. Africa performs better than Latin 
America with respect to the number of days (11) and procedures (64) required to start a 
business. Latin America also scores poorly when we focus on the time required to enforce 
contracts – 470 days, compared to 423 in East Asia and 282 in high income countries. Similarly, 
according to the IMF Latin America is the region with the highest (i) total number of taxes paid 
by businesses (49); (ii) number of hours per year needed to prepare, fill an pay taxes (549); and 
(iii) taxes paid as a percentage of profit (54.5 percent). This compares to 40 taxes, 398 hours 
and 48.5 percent of profits in the average low and middle income country, and 18 taxes, 181 
hours and 38.8 percent of profits in the average high income country. 
Whether these regional conditions hold at the country level is the focus of the next 
section.  
2.1  Is informal competition a serious obstacle in all countries in Latin America? 
Though informality is prevalent in Latin America, the countries in which firms cite 
informal competition as the most serious obstacle are a surprise. For Uruguay, Colombia, 
Paraguay, and Peru, competition from the informal firms is reported as the top obstacle. This is 
surprising since there is little correlation between the estimated size of the informal sector and 
whether formal firms identify informal competition as an obstacle to doing business. In a recent 
IMF study that estimates the size of the informal economy in most economies of Latin America, 
Vuletin (2006) finds that Paraguay, Nicaragua and Honduras have the largest informal 
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2006). While Paraguay is one of the countries in our sample in which firms identify informal 
competition as a top constraint, Nicaragua and Honduras are not. In addition, Uruguay, the 
country in which the largest percentage of firms that identify informal competition as a top 
constraint, the informal economy is comparatively small (36.2 percent of GDP).  The correlation 
between the percent of firms citing informal competition as a top three constraint and the 
estimated size of the informal economy gives us a low correlation of 0.019.  
 
Size of the informal economy (% of 
GDP) 















Source: Vuletin (2006): Table 3. 
  
The results of this correlation may seem counterintuitive since we would expect a strong 
relationship between larger informal sectors and greater competition stemming from it. The 
argument is that the size of the informal sector is good indicators of the level of competition 
formal firms contend with in their markets. As is shown above, we do not find that and it is clear 
in our data, the size of the informal sector does not determine the level of competition it 
presents to firms in the formal sector. But if size of the informal sector is not a determinant of 
competition, what is? 
  14 3  What environments are associated with intense informal competition? 
In most developing countries, regulatory and legal obligations can be avoided where 
governments are incapable of enforcing all or some of its laws. In that type of environment, firms 
can choose to comply or not comply with these rules and regulations and bear or not bear the 
costs of compliance.  
The presence of avoidable regulatory costs has competitive effects on the intensity of 
competition between formal and informal firms. Each legal or regulatory obligation that a firm 
chooses to avoid translates into a cost advantage that this firm enjoys against all competing 
firms that complied and did not avoid these costs. A business environment that has more 
regulatory and legal obligations on formal firms than other environments will also provide a 
longer menu of costs that firms can choose to avoid. Therefore, the more regulations that exist, 
the greater the potential cost differential between informal firms that comply with none of these 
regulations and the formal firms that comply with all (many or some) of them.  
The presence of a larger menu of avoidable costs exacerbates the deleterious effects of 
informal competition in industries characterized by low entry costs. Our previous empirical 
findings showed that industries with high fixed cost are generally unaffected by informal 
competition. Firms in industry where the costs of entry are low are under greater competitive 
threat from informal firms all things being equal. In environments with high regulatory 
requirements this competitive pressure for low cost of entry firms is exacerbated because the 
cost differentials between formal and informal firms are potentially higher. In economies with 
high regulatory costs, informal firms enter markets where formal firms incur relatively high 
compliance costs, and against them, informal firms enjoy the substantial cost advantages of 
skirting some or all of the many laws and regulations. In sectors where informal firms do not 
enter because of high costs of entry, formal firms are not likely to be affected no matter what the 
regulatory compliance requirements entail.   
3.1 Hypothesis   
Past studies established a positive correlation between the scope and number of 
regulations and the size of the informal sector (Djankov et al 2002, Botero et al 2003, Loyaza, 
Oviedo, and Servén 2005).  However, in our data, the size of the informal sector is not a factor 
in explaining where informal competition is most effective. We hypothesize that the cost 
differential, based on avoided regulatory costs, between formal and informal firms is a major 
determinant of competitive effectiveness. The regulatory environment determines competitive 
effectiveness of the informal sector by how large that cost differential is between firms that 
  15 comply with the rules and regulations and those that do not. A combination of the extent of 
regulation and the government’s effectiveness in enforcing these determines how effective 
informal competition will be.  
The number of laws and regulations is not the only factor that determines how onerous 
the regulatory environment is. The government’s capacity to implement and enforce these rules 
and regulations is an important determinant of how difficult the legal and regulatory 
requirements may be. If the government is lax or incapable in its implementation of the rules 
and regulations, laws on its books will count for naught. A firm’s decision to comply or not 
comply with its legal and regulatory requirements is based on the probability of getting caught 
for non-compliance and the nature of the punishment. If the many regulations on the books are 
not implemented and enforced, the probability of getting caught is rather low and the 
inducements for non-compliance are rather high; for both formal and informal firms.  
Taking what we have learned in this paper about the relatively higher competitive threat 
that informal firms present formal firms in low entry cost industries and the hypothesis we 
present above about the relationship between effective competition and the level of regulations 
and the government’s capacity to enforce these, we hypothesize that as effective regulation 
increases, firms in industries with relatively lower entry costs will feel the sting of informal 
competition more than firms in industries with relatively higher entry costs.  In other 
environments, the differences between low and high entry cost industries will be 
indistinguishable.  
Firms in industries with low fixed costs, which mean that there are low entry costs, will 
more significantly feel the sting of informal competition in countries with high levels of 
government capacity and high levels of regulation because the cost differential between 
informal firms and formal firms will be highest in this environment. In countries with high levels 
of government capacity and onerous regulation, informal firms risk being caught for skirting the 
rules but benefit substantially from doing so. Given the high level of regulatory costs that 
informal firms avoid, they enjoy substantial cost advantages against formal firms that are forced 
to comply with regulations under the effective vigilance of a capable government.  In all other 
environments, firms in low entry cost industries will be relatively indifferent to informal 
competition since either regulatory requirements are not that stringent or enforcement is so lax 
that even formal firms skirt the rules and dissipate most of the cost advantages that informal 
firms may enjoy from not complying with the rules.  
Below, we present the empirical strategy we use to test this hypothesis.  
  16 3.2 Empirical  strategy 
We test the hypothesis that firms in industries with relatively lower entry costs will be 
most adversely affected by informal competition in economies where there exists a relatively 
onerous set of government rules and regulations and a government with the capacity to enforce 
these.   
To confirm or reject the hypotheses presented above, we provide an econometric 
specification with a set of regulatory and law and enforcement variables to measure the relative 
level of regulatory obligations in an economy, and a government effectiveness variable to 
measure the capacity of government to enforce these rules. The description of the main 
business environment and the government effectiveness variable, their sources and the 
expected relation to the dependent variable can be found in Section 1.2 above. For the 
econometric specification, we use the regulatory indexes, from Doing Business, and the 
government effectiveness index, from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, to divide the 
countries in the data into four groups; good performers and bad performers with respect to the 
regulatory environment and within those two groups we divide further into good performers and 
bad performers with respect to government effectiveness.  
The regulations examined are: tax rates, tax on profits, tax on labor, and taxes on other 
aspects of commercial operations not included in profits or labor. We also use the cost of 
starting a business and the minimum capital requirement to obtain an operating license. We use 
each of the rules and regulations and include them separately as independent variables in our 
econometric model.  
In order to test our hypothesis we introduce in the linear probability model regression
8
 of 
with the same variable specification we introduced in Section 1.4 and add an interaction term 
between the business environment (level of regulation and government capacity) and financial 
dependency (Rajan-Zingales scale) as the proxy for the cost of entry; the higher the financial 
dependence the high the cost of entry. The econometric model appears as: 
 
                                             ijk ijk k j k ijk X E F C Y ε γ λ + + × + = ) (                                        (2) 
 
The dependent variable (Y ) is a binary variable takes on the value one (1) if firm (i) in industry 
(j) in country (k) considers competitors from the informal sector to be one of the top-three 
                                                      
8
 Because we wanted a clear interpretation of the interaction terms, we did not use maximum likelihood methods 
used in discrete choice models to estimate the discrete, 0 or 1, dependent variable.  
  17 obstacles for their businesses and zero (0) otherwise.  The dependent variable is a function of a 
constant (C ), a variable (F ) to represent the financial dependence of industries interacted with 
a categorical business environment variable (E ) that correspond to the four (4) categories 
described above, and a vector of firm characteristics ( ), as in the previous specification, and 
an error term (
X
ε ).  In estimating Equation (2), we include country level fixed effects and we 
cluster at the industry and regional levels.    
We are interested in the sign, positive, negative or zero, of the interaction terms between 
effective government regulation (the product of government effectiveness and level of 
regulation) and the level of financial dependence. The expected sign of the interaction terms are 
for each of the four country categories is:  
1.  For countries in which there exists high levels of government capacity and high 
levels of regulation, firms in industries with low costs to entry will be more 
adversely affected by this environment than other industries, the coefficient for 
the following term will be negative:   ) ( 0 1 1 E Fj × <λ ; 
2.  For countries in which there exists high levels of government capacity and low 
levels of regulation, firms in industries with low costs to entry will not be any more 
adversely affected by this environment than any other industries. The coefficient 
for the following term will be zero:   ) ( 0 2 2 E Fj × =λ ; 
3.  For countries in which there exists with low levels of government capacity and 
high levels of regulation, firms in industries with low costs to entry will not be any 
more adversely affected by this environment than any other industries. The 
coefficient for the following term will be zero:   ) ( 0 3 3 E Fj × = λ ; and 
4.  For countries in which there exists low levels of government capacity and low 
levels of regulation, firms in industries with low costs to entry will not be any more 
adversely affected by this environment than any other industries. The coefficient 
for the following term will be zero:  ) ( 0 4 4 E Fj × =λ . 
3.3 Empirical  results 
The empirical results, shown in Table 6 of the Appendix, support our hypothesis with 
some exceptions. We find that the results of our specification hold; firms most resembling 
informal firms are more adversely affected by informal competition though in each of the 
specifications, the size of the firm is no longer statistically significant.  In addition, we find 
support for our hypothesis; firms in industries with lower entry costs are most adversely affected 
  18 by competition from informal firms in environments where there exist relatively high regulatory 
obligations and high levels of government capacity to enforce the law so that formal firms 
comply with these obligations. However, we found that it is only in economies with low 
government capacity and high regulations that all firms, regardless of how difficult it is or is not 
to enter their market, find informal competition a threat (see Table 7 for test of statistical 
significance of other interaction term coefficients). Countries in this category are usually Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru, depending on the specific regulation 
included as an independent variable in the model. Conversely, it is also the case that firms in 
industries characterized by low entry costs identify informality as a competitive threat even in 
the best business environments—where there is high government capacity and comparatively 
low levels of regulation. Firms with relatively lower entry costs in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay, depending on which regulation is included in the regression, will 
feel the sting of regulation more than firms in industries characterized by high entry costs. Our 
hypothesis underestimated the sensitivity to regulatory enforcement and its relation to informal 
competition; even where there is a light regulatory touch but competent enforcement, firms that 
escape this enforcement and compete in easy to enter markets can affect the profits of formal 
firms that fully comply with the law. We had predicted that this would only be the case where 
there were high levels of regulation and competent government enforcement.  
Finally, by using the estimated parameters of the linear probability model, and taking tax 
rate regulation as an example of an enforced regulation, we find that in an economy with 
relatively onerous tax regulations and a government that poorly enforces its tax code, the 
percent of firms adversely affected by informal competition will be reduced from 38.8 to 37.7 
percent when the government increases enforcement to the level found in the high capacity 
group of countries. This reduction provides some clues as to what reforms policy makers should 
look to if they want to reduce the deleterious effects of informality.  
4 Conclusions 
Using firm level data for 6,466 manufacturing firms across 14 countries in Central and 
South America, we show that firms that cite informal competition as a top business environment 
obstacle largely resemble those informal firms that they complain about. Smaller firms, that are 
more credit constrained, that underutilize their production capacity and that serve smaller 
customers identify practices of competitors in the informal sector as a serious business 
constraint.  Also, firms operating in capital intensive industries, such as chemical, electronics, 
machinery and metals, are by and large less likely to see informal competition as a threat.   
  19 Moreover we find that firms operating in industries with low costs to entry (proxied by low 
financial dependence) will be more adversely hit by the regulatory and enforcement business 
environment in which they operate. More specifically, managers of firms in those industries cite 
informal competition as top obstacle in countries with high levels of government capacity and 
high levels of regulation. Firms that risk being caught by skirting the rules will enjoy substantial 
cost advantages against direct competitors that do not take on that risk and comply with these 
regulations.   
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between the informal 
sector and the rest of the economy. It clearly shows that formal and informal firms compete 
against each other and are not in segmented and separate markets. It is a first attempt in 
identifying the firm and business environment characteristics that are associated with higher 
degree of impediment to business activities from the informal sector.  
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  23 Appendices 
Table 1: Description of the variables and data sources 
Variables  Description and data sources 




Logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Available at: 
www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
Logarithm of the 




Logarithm of the difference between the year when operations 
started and the year of the interview plus 1. 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Available at: 
www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
Firm has a line of 




Binary variable that indicates whether the firm has both a line of 
credit or outstanding loan and an overdraft facility. This variable 
takes the value 1 if the firm has a both a line of credit or outstanding 
loan and an overdraft facility and 0 otherwise. 
 






to produce in the 
last fiscal year. 
(caputil) 
It is a percentage of the level of utilization of the facility in 
comparison with the maximum output that would be possible to 
produce. 
 





from sales other 
than national 
sales. 
When the percentage of the revenue that comes from national sales 
is below 90% we consider that the firm is an exporter. 
(exporter) 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Available at: 
www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
 
Main buyer of 
production is a 




The binary dummy variable takes on a value of one (1) when the 
firm’s main buyer of its outputs are medium-size private firms (20-
100 workers), small private firms (fewer than 20 workers, or 
individuals, and a value of zero (0) otherwise.  
 





industry to which 
firm belongs 
(i.industry) 
In the manufacturing sub-sample, there are 21 manufacturing 
industries represented. The list of these can be found in Table 8 of 
this Appendix. 
 




Industry-level Rajan-Zingales (1998) classification of industry is 
based on how much external financing firms in each industry need to 




operate and grow.  Higher values of this index mean that the industry 
is comparatively more dependent on external financing.  
(findep) 
 
Source: Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (1998), "Financial dependence 
and growth,"  American Economic Review, American Economic 
Association, 88(3): 559-86. 
 




tax, plus the 
administrative 




The tax a company must pay or withhold in a given year to pay profit 
or corporate income tax and labor taxes. This variable also 
measures the administrative burden of paying taxes.  Taxes are 
measured at all levels of government.  
 
Variable is normalized to a zero to one variable where one (1) 
indicates the highest tax rate.  
 
Source: Doing Business 2006, Creating Jobs. Available at: 
www.doingbusiness.org. 





Proportion of profits paid by businesses as a percent of commercial 
profits.  
 
Variable is normalized to a zero to one variable where one (1) 
indicates the highest tax rate. 
 
Source: Doing Business 2006, Creating Jobs. Available at: 
www.doingbusiness.org. 




Taxes and mandatory contributions on labor paid by businesses as a 
percent of commercial profits. Includes mandatory social security 
contributions paid by the employer both to public and private entities, 
as well as other taxes or contributions related to employing workers. 
 
 
Variable is normalized to a zero to one variable where one (1) 
indicates the highest labor tax rate. 
 
Source: Doing Business 2006, Creating Jobs. Available at: 
www.doingbusiness.org. 
Taxes other than 




Taxes and mandatory contributions paid by the business that are not 
already included in the previous two categories; taxes on profits and 
taxes on labor.   
 
Variable is normalized to a zero to one variable where one (1) 
indicates the highest tax rate. 
 




costs to start a 
business. 
 
Total cost to start a business. Costs include obtaining all necessary 
licenses and permits and completing any required notifications, 
verifications or inscriptions for the company and employees with 
relevant authorities. 
 
  25 (sb_cost)  Variable is normalized to a zero to one variable where one (1) 
indicates the highest startup costs. 
 




start a business. 
 
(sb_mcap) 
The paid-in minimum capital requirement that the entrepreneur 
needs to deposit in a bank before registration starts. The minimum 
capital requirement is computed as percent of per capita income. 
 
Variable is normalized to a zero to one variable where one (1) 
indicates the highest capital requirement costs. 
 






The quality of public and civil services and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. 
 
Variable is normalized to a zero to one variable where one (1) 
indicates lowest government effectiveness.  
 
Source: World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/
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Entire sample                
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  6466  0.40  0.49  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 6386  3.34  1.31  0  9.82 
Age of the firm (in log)  6385  2.92  0.78  0  5.28 
Access to formal credit  6466  0.69  0.46  0  1 
Capacity utilization  6427  70.86  22.20  0  100 
Firm exports  6466  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  6466  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Argentina          
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  646  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 630  3.55  1.44  0.69  9.82 
Age of the firm (in log)  646  3.17  0.86  0.69  5.15 
Access to formal credit  646  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Capacity utilization  641  75.12  20.32  0  110 
Firm exports  646  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  646  0.61  0.49  0  1 
Bolivia          
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  366  0.54  0.50  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 359  3.21  1.14  1.10  7.18 
Age of the firm (in log)  365  2.86  0.78  0.69  4.57 
Access to formal credit  366  0.57  0.50  0  1 
Capacity utilization  364  63.24  23.75  5  100 
Firm exports  366  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  366  0.70  0.46  0  1 
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Colombia          
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  634  0.58  0.49  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 634  3.10  1.18  1.10  8.22 
Age of the firm (in log)  633  2.63  0.81  0.69  4.99 
Access to formal credit  634  0.81  0.39  0  1 
Capacity utilization  634  69.02  20.93  0  100 
Firm exports  634  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  634  0.61  0.49  0  1 
Mexico          
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  1122  0.37  0.48  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 1118  3.31  1.39  1.39  8.41 
Age of the firm (in log)  1059  2.77  0.71  0  5.28 
Access to formal credit  1122  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Capacity utilization  1117  74.21  20.13  0  100 
Firm exports  1122  0.12  0.32  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  1122  0.81  0.39  0  1 
Panama          
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  240  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 232  3.15  1.14  0.85  7.50 
Age of the firm (in log)  238  3.07  0.72  0  4.32 
Access to formal credit  240  0.80  0.40  0  1 
Capacity utilization  236  71.16  24.69  10  100 
Firm exports  240  0.15  0.36  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  240  0.55  0.50  0  1 
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Peru          
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  360  0.45  0.50  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 358  3.54  1.40  1.25  8.54 
Age of the firm (in log)  360  2.77  0.75  1.10  5.03 
Access to formal credit  360  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Capacity utilization  360  72.03  19.17  15  100 
Firm exports  360  0.36  0.48  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  360  0.52  0.50  0  1 
Paraguay          
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  380  0.49  0.50  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 368  3.19  0.97  1.15  6.38 
Age of the firm (in log)  376  2.93  0.72  0.69  4.75 
Access to formal credit  380  0.67  0.47  0  1 
Capacity utilization  378  65.83  25.39  0  100 
Firm exports  380  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  380  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Uruguay          
Variables 
Number 
of Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  360  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 353  3.10  1.01  1.10  6.46 
Age of the firm (in log)  358  3.06  0.91  0.69  4.97 
Access to formal credit  360  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Capacity utilization  354  67.54  23.10  0  100 
Firm exports  360  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  360  0.64  0.48  0  1 
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Chile          
Variables  Number 
of Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  640  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 628  3.74  1.24  0  8.41 
Age of the firm (in log)  637  3.20  0.71  0.69  5.02 
Access to formal credit  640  0.86  0.35  0  1 
Capacity utilization  637  71.13  23.48  0  100 
Firm exports  640  0.16  0.37  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  640  0.44  0.50  0  1 
Ecuador          
Variables  Number 
of Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  359  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 353  3.51  1.25  0.69  7.63 
Age of the firm (in log)  355  2.98  0.73  1.39  4.76 
Access to formal credit  359  0.76  0.43  0  1 
Capacity utilization  356  70.12  23.17  5  100 
Firm exports  359  0.14  0.34  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  359  0.50  0.50  0  1 
El Salvador          
Variables  Number 
of Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  434  0.41  0.49  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 432  3.54  1.45  0.69  8.23 
Age of the firm (in log)  434  2.86  0.75  0.69  4.81 
Access to formal credit  434  0.74  0.44  0  1 
Capacity utilization  432  70.45  21.33  3  100 
Firm exports  434  0.32  0.47  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  434  0.56  0.50  0  1 
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Honduras          
Variables  Number 
of Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  256  0.34  0.48  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 254  3.24  1.42  1.10  7.83 
Age of the firm (in log)  255  2.81  0.67  0  4.28 
Access to formal credit  256  0.69  0.46  0  1 
Capacity utilization  255  76.22  19.84  10  100 
Firm exports  256  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  256  0.68  0.47  0  1 
Guatemala          
Variables  Number 
of Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  312  0.42  0.49  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 310  3.45  1.41  0.69  7.62 
Age of the firm (in log)  312  2.89  0.71  0  4.76 
Access to formal credit  312  0.68  0.47  0  1 
Capacity utilization  306  67.81  23.28  4  100 
Firm exports  312  0.29  0.46  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  312  0.67  0.47  0  1 
Nicaragua          
Variables  Number 
of Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Competition from the informal sector  357  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Firm Size (logarithm of employment) 357  2.76  1.13  0  7.42 
Age of the firm (in log)  357  3.01  0.72  0.69  4.63 
Access to formal credit  357  0.49  0.50  0  1 
Capacity utilization  357  70.53  22.98  4  100 
Firm exports  357  0.14  0.34  0  1 
Firm sells to small customers  357  0.79  0.41  0  1 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on 2006 Enterprise Surveys.   
  31 Table 3: Probit Regression Pooled Industry results (industry and regional fixed effects) 
Dependent variable: Whether firm ranked practices of informal firms as a top three obstacles 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Firm  size  (in  log)  -0.071 -0.087 -0.082 -0.075 -0.070 -0.041 -0.031 
  (4.07)*** (4.85)*** (4.43)*** (4.08)*** (3.77)*** (2.17)**  (1.61)* 
Age of the firm (in log)  0.098  0.100  0.095  0.093  0.089  0.087 
    (4.37)*** (4.43)*** (4.22)*** (4.15)*** (3.99)*** (3.87)*** 
Access to formal credit    -0.092  -0.085  -0.077  -0.080  -0.078 
      (2.15)** (1.95)* (1.77)* (1.84)* (1.80)* 
Capacity  utilization      -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
       (1.94)*  (2.05)**  (1.98)** 
Firm  exports        -0.264  -0.244 
        (5.64)***  (5.29)*** 
Firm has small customers as main buyers          0.142 
         (3.55)*** 
Constant  -0.203 -0.480 -0.473 -0.521 -0.474 -0.502 -0.660 
  (0.26) (0.62) (0.62) (0.70) (0.65) (0.69) (0.91) 
Observations  6378 6302 6302 6302 6265 6265 6265 
Robust z statistics in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
Source: Authors’ estimates based on 2006 Enterprise Surveys     
 
 
  32 Table 3.a: Probit model (table 3) with specific reference to the industry dummies 
Manufacture 
industries 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Omitted industry: textile 
Food product and 
beverage  -0.151 -0.170  -0.168  -0.162  -0.163  -0.190 -0.194 
 (2.19)**  (2.49)**  (2.47)**  (2.37)**  (2.33)**  (2.78)***  (2.84)*** 
Wearing apparel  0.044  0.040  0.036  0.038  0.046  0.048  0.055 
 (0.66)  (0.59)  (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.66)  (0.71)  (0.82) 
Tanning and 
dressing of 
leather -0.081  -0.104  -0.110  -0.110  -0.110  -0.102  -0.121 
 (0.66)  (0.85)  (0.90)  (0.91)  (0.90)  (0.84)  (0.98) 
Wood and wood 
product -0.394  -0.421  -0.420  -0.413  -0.416  -0.398  -0.395 
 (3.00)***  (3.23)***  (3.22)***  (3.16)***  (3.18)***  (3.03)***  (3.01)*** 
Paper and paper 
product -0.191  -0.224  -0.239  -0.244  -0.248  -0.254  -0.213 
 (0.98)  (1.10)  (1.21)  (1.24)  (1.25)  (1.28)  (1.04) 
Publishing -0.155  -0.177  -0.172  -0.160  -0.150  -0.179  -0.146 
 (1.44)  (1.56)  (1.51)  (1.40)  (1.31)  (1.55)  (1.25) 
Chemicals -0.312  -0.340  -0.336  -0.324  -0.320  -0.345  -0.333 
 (3.69)***  (4.03)***  (4.01)***  (3.78)***  (3.63)***  (3.98)***  (3.88)*** 
Rubber and 
Plastic -0.273  -0.275  -0.267  -0.251  -0.253  -0.261  -0.246 
 (2.89)***  (2.90)***  (2.79)***  (2.59)***  (2.59)***  (2.72)***  (2.65)*** 
Non-metallic 
mineral product  -0.294  -0.308  -0.308  -0.303  -0.310  -0.324  -0.324 
 (2.52)**  (2.67)***  (2.66)***  (2.61)***  (2.68)***  (2.77)***  (2.77)*** 
Basic metals  -0.177  -0.185  -0.186  -0.173  -0.176  -0.183  -0.161 
 (0.75)  (0.77)  (0.77)  (0.70)  (0.71)  (0.74)  (0.63) 
Metal Product  -0.401  -0.419  -0.419  -0.410  -0.410  -0.433  -0.415 
 (3.19)***  (3.35)***  (3.35)***  (3.29)***  (3.29)***  (3.45)***  (3.37)*** 
Machinery and 
Equipment -0.597  -0.623  -0.620  -0.611  -0.597  -0.597  -0.582 
 (4.77)***  (4.83)***  (4.81)***  (4.71)***  (4.68)***  (4.98)***  (4.86)*** 
Electrical 
Machinery -0.354  -0.354  -0.362  -0.355  -0.357  -0.333  -0.325 
 (2.38)**  (2.24)**  (2.29)**  (2.27)**  (2.28)**  (2.25)**  (2.22)** 
  33 Radio and 
Television -0.214  -0.133  -0.135  -0.122  -0.139  -0.094  -0.066 
 (1.02)  (0.66)  (0.69)  (0.61)  (0.70)  (0.50)  (0.35) 
Motor Vehicle  -0.100  -0.113  -0.114  -0.104  -0.113  -0.137  -0.138 
 (0.37)  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.40)  (0.42)  (0.51)  (0.49) 
Other Transport 
equipment -0.232  -0.267  -0.294  -0.315  -0.362  -0.388  -0.411 
 (0.30)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.43)  (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.57) 
Furniture -0.150  -0.187  -0.189  -0.180  -0.175  -0.181  -0.187 
 (1.51)  (1.86)*  (1.89)*  (1.79)*  (1.72)*  (1.73)*  (1.76)* 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
ISIC codes are used to identify industries 
Sources: Authors’ estimates based on Enterprise Surveys data 2006      
 
















Firm  Size  1        
Age of the firm  0.249  1         
Access to formal credit  0.178  0.076  1       
Capacity  utilization  0.165 -0.042 0.126  1     
Firm  exports  0.359 0.045 0.037  0.044  1   
Firm sells to small customers  -0.262  -0.05  -0.097  -0.06  -0.203  1 







  35 Table 5: Probit Regression Pooled Industry results (no industry fixed-effects -industry and regional clustering) 
Dependent variable: Firm ranked practices of informal firms as a top three obstacles 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Financial Dependence  -0.154 -0.161 -0.157 -0.151 -0.151 -0.157 -0.150 
  (3.17)*** (3.36)*** (3.28)*** (3.12)*** (3.05)*** (3.19)*** (3.05)***
Firm size (in log )  -0.064 -0.076 -0.070 -0.062 -0.057 -0.030 -0.020 
  (3.73)*** (4.31)*** (3.88)*** (3.48)*** (3.16)*** (1.62)  (1.06) 
Age of the firm (in log)    0.077 0.080 0.075 0.072 0.067 0.065 
   (3.33)*** (3.42)*** (3.21)*** (3.09)***  (2.91)*** (2.79)***
Access to formal credit      -0.103 -0.094 -0.086 -0.090 -0.088 
      (2.40)** (2.16)** (1.99)** (2.08)** (2.04)** 
Capacity utilization      -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
      (1.99)**  (2.08)**  (1.99)** 
Firm exports       -0.244  -0.222 
       (5.13)*** (4.75)***
Firm sells to small customers        0.151 
        ( 3 . 7 3 ) * * *
Constant  -0.138 -0.339 -0.302 -0.331 -0.226 -0.233 -0.371 
  (0.98) (2.14)**  (1.93)*  (2.12)**  (1.42) (1.54) (2.42)** 
Observations  6385 6309 6309 6309 6272 6272 6272 
Robust  z  statistics  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
         
Sources: Authors estimated based on Enterprise Surveys and Rajan-Zingales data 
 
  36 Table 6:  Linear Probability Model Regression (country fixed effects and regional-industry clustering) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 












Financial dependence (Rajan-Zingales)  -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.16 -0.06 
  (4.30)*** (2.89)*** (2.54)** (4.30)*** (9.65)***  (1.38) 
Low government capacity and low regulation 0.13 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.04 
  (3.39)*** (1.91)* (2.25)**  (4.07)***  (5.94)*** (0.75) 
Low government capacity and high regulation 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.04 
  (1.21) (0.15) (0.54) (1.21)  (2.62)***  (0.73) 
High government capacity and low regulation  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.07    0.05 
  (2.14)** (1.33)  (1.51) (2.12)**  n.a.  (1.02) 
Log of firm employment  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (1.37) (1.26) (1.26) (1.36) (1.28) (1.33) 
Log  of  firm  age  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (2.89)*** (2.87)*** (2.86)*** (2.88)*** (2.89)*** (2.86)*** 
Use of commercial credit lines  -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
  (2.21)** (2.21)** (2.17)** (2.21)** (2.19)** (2.19)** 
Capacity utilization  -0.00  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (2.47)** (2.47)** (2.49)** (2.43)** (2.46)** (2.47)** 
Firm exports  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
  (4.88)*** (4.84)*** (4.83)*** (4.97)*** (4.85)*** (4.85)*** 
Firm has small buyers  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  (3.89)*** (3.88)*** (3.80)*** (3.86)*** (3.83)*** (3.91)*** 
Constant  0.40 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.39 
  (7.25)*** (7.00)*** (6.84)*** (7.25)*** (6.82)*** (7.07)*** 
Observations  6272 6272 6272 6272 6272 6272 
R-squared 0.07  0.06  0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
n.a. –  estimate is not available for that cell        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
  37 Table 7. Test of statistical significance test for difference from zero for interaction terms 
Tax rates 
Financial dependence interacted with high regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 0.14  
Prob. > F = 0.7045 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-high government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 2.90*  
Prob. > F = 0.0893 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418)  =    5.28** 
Prob. > F =   0.0221 
Taxes on profits 
Financial dependence interacted with high regulation-low government capacity 
F (1, 418) = 0.47 
Prob. > F = 0.4936 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-high government capacity 
F(1, 418)  = 5.76** 
Prob. > F = 0.0168 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418)    =    0.46 
Prob. > F  = 0.4971 
Taxes on labor 
Financial dependence interacted with high regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 1.45 
Prob. > F = 0.2286 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-high government capacity 
F(1, 418)  = 5.84** 
Prob. > F = 0.0161 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418)  = 2.30 
Prob.> F = 0.1305 
Taxes other than on labor or profits 
Financial dependence interacted with high regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 1.91 
Prob. > F = 0.1673 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-high government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 2.90* 
Prob. > F= 0.0894 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 6.59*** 
Prob. > F = 0.0106 
Cost to start a business 
Financial dependence interacted with high regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 0.83 
Prob. > F = .3637 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-high government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 7.59*** 
Prob. > F = 0.0061 
Median capital requirement to start a business 
Financial dependence interacted with high regulation-low government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 1.21 
Prob. > F = 0.2722 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-high government capacity 
F(1, 418) = 13.66*** 
Prob. > F = 0.0002 
Financial dependence interacted with low regulation-low government capacity  F(1, 418) = 0.17 
  38 Prob. > F= 0.6805 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
  39 Table 8 
Industries included in the sample of manufacturing sector (2-digit ISIC Rev.3 code D) 





15 - Manufacture of food products and beverages  0.14 1,665 
17 - Manufacture of textiles  0.40 729 
18 - Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  0.003 1,062 
19 - Manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear  -0.14 106 
20 - Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture  0.28 99 
21 - Manufacture of paper and paper products  0.18 26 
22 - Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  0.2 83 
24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  1.49 923 
25 - Manufacture of rubber and plastics products  0.23 248 
26 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  0.006 387 
27 - Manufacture of basic metals  0.09 62 
28 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  0.24 372 
29 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  0.45 358 
30 - Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  1.06 3 
31 - Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  0.77 102 
32 - Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus  1.04 48 
33 - Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks  0.96 5 
34 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  0.39 17 
35 - Manufacture of other transport equipment  0.31 3 
36 - Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  0.24 168 
Total   6,466 
Source: United Nations website: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcs.asp?Cl=2&Lg=1&Co=D,  
Source: Rajan et al (1998)  
Source: Enterprise Surveys, manufacturing sub-sample. 
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